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Abstract
Machine ethics is an emerging, interdisciplinary field that focuses on if – and if so, how –
machines can make ethical decisions autonomously. Through a close study of two positions on
whether or not machines can be moral agents, this project sheds light on a clash of assumptions
that is keeping the field of machine ethics in limbo. After making this clash of assumptions clear,
I raise two questions which get at the scope of machine ethics itself:
1. What makes ethical decision-making different from other kinds of decision-making?
2. To what extent can machines engage with ethics and make ethical decisions?
I address the first question by arguing that ethics is distinct because it requires the ability to
understand and participate in human conventions. I address the second question by arguing that
ethics has always been informed by our humanity, but machine ethics is an opportunity to expand
our understanding of ethics so that machines can engage with it insofar as they are machines.
This project aims to contribute to machine ethics by proposing a major shift in perspective, from
a focus on human abilities to a focus on machines and their own radically novel abilities.
2
Table of Contents
01: Introduction –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 3
02: A Disagreement about Agency ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 12
03: Machine Ethics in Limbo ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 23
04: What Makes Ethics Distinct? ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 28
05: To What Extent Can Machines Make Ethical Decisions? ––––––––- 37
06: Conclusion –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 49




>> What is machine ethics?
It goes by several names, including robot ethics, roboethics, machine morality, and
computational morality, but machine ethics is the predominant name for the emerging,
interdisciplinary field that is focused on if – and if so, how – machines can make ethical
decisions autonomously. The field is not to be confused with computer ethics, which is
concerned with the ethical usage of technology by humans. As a field, machine ethics is no more
than forty years old, with the term machine ethics being coined in 1987 by M. Mitchell Waldrop,
a writer with a PhD in elementary particle physics. In an article about how machines might be
held responsible for their actions, he notes the following:
“One thing that is apparent ... is that intelligent machines will
embody values, assumptions, and purposes, whether their
programmers consciously intend them to or not. Thus, as
computers and robots become more and more intelligent, it
becomes imperative that we think carefully and explicitly about
what those built-in values are. Perhaps what we need is, in fact, a
theory and practice of machine ethics, in the spirit of Asimov’s
three laws of robotics” (Waldrop 38).
It would take more than a decade before the work on machine ethics would really begin. In the
early 2000s, the first conference was held to establish the theoretical foundations of the field and
more articles were published. Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen’s book, Moral Machines, was
released in 2010. Philosopher Susan Leigh Anderson and computer scientist Michael Anderson
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published Machine Ethics, an edited volume of essays written by scholars belonging to a number
of disciplines, in 2011.
As the field continues to find itself, several scholars have tried to identify the main
motivations that have arisen in the discourse. An article written by philosopher Marcello Guarini
in 2013 views machine ethics as having a practical side and a reflexive side. Practically
motivated researchers are concerned with what it takes to build ethical machines, while
reflexively motivated researchers are interested in how machines can help us to better understand
what ethics is or could be (Guarini 214). In a more recent article from 2020, a group of
researchers with backgrounds in engineering, computer science, and the ethics of technology
describe a similar set of motivations but with different language. They choose to divide the
motivations of machine ethics amongst philosophers and engineers, although they clarify that the
two groups are not disconnected.
>> Machine Ethics, Fast and Slow
I prefer Guarini’s framing, especially because machine ethics is worked on by other
researchers such as cognitive scientists, linguists, and psychologists as well. Furthermore, I
consider myself a staunch advocate for the necessity of interdisciplinary collaboration in order
for machine ethics to make real progress. I am currently an undergraduate studying both
computer science and philosophy, and throughout my education I have gained a sense of the
cultures present in each discipline. Of course, my experience is relatively limited, but what I
have noticed is this: many computer scientists and technologists, especially those working in
industry, are driven by the desire to make things that are cool. They love a good challenge and
they love to push the limits of what’s possible. And it goes without saying, the tech industry is
strongly influenced by an interest in what’s profitable. The result of these motivations is a fervent
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forward-motion without enough regard for the potential impacts that come from what gets made.
This is especially true for projects that unexpectedly explode in their scale (the Internet being
one of the most obvious examples). And universities have only begun to include topics like
ethics in their curriculums for computer science and engineering within the last five years or so.
Harvard University’s computer science department became a national model when they
introduced a “distributed pedagogy” approach in 2019 that pairs graduate students in philosophy
with computer science faculty to make sure that computer science students develop an awareness
of ethics throughout their education (Karoff 2019).
Philosophy does not move nearly as fast as computer science does. But what we have
before us is an opportunity to guide the breakneck progress of technology by working together,
instead of addressing issues after the damage is done. Philosophers have a wealth of tools for
deeply considering the current and future impacts of technology, but many of them lack the
technical knowledge to really do so. By collaborating with each other, philosophers and
computer scientists (along with researchers from related disciplines) can better address the
question of what computers can do versus what they should do.
>> Intelligence, Then and Now
Some historical context is necessary to properly frame my approach to machine ethics. It
is particularly important to note the change in the goals of computer scientists working on AI.
But first, I should make clear what the word ‘machine’ means. I, and other researchers who
discuss machine ethics, use the word ‘machine’ to refer to any man-made system – composed of
either software, hardware, or both – that has many parts which come together to perform any
number of functions. This definition is meant to capture not only the existence of robots, but also
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complex programs that may not have much of a physical presence, other than the presence of the
computer being used to run it.
The publishing of Alan Turing’s article on computing machinery and intelligence in 1950
is seen as a turning point in the discussion about computing, and during the mid-twentieth
century, there was growing excitement about the prospect of simulating intelligence. Early
attempts often involved choosing a task which seemed to require a good deal of intelligence, then
creating a program which carries out that task. Chess was one such challenge which became very
popular, and Turing was the first to produce a chess-playing algorithm one year after publishing
his influential article. Other projects, such as the development of a program that could translate
English to Russian, eventually garnered attention (and precious funding) from the U.S.
government.
The term Artificial Intelligence was coined in 1956 when a handful of researchers came
together during a summer at Dartmouth College. American computer scientist John McCarthy
was the organizer of the conference and is considered one of the “fathers of AI” for his work
(Knapp 2008). According to McCarthy, the purpose of their meeting was “to proceed on the basis
of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle
be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it” (McCarthy et al.). The
researchers soon realized that this goal, so easily described, could not be accomplished in one
summer. Years later, McCarthy commented on the outcome of the workshop by saying, “the
main reason the 1956 Dartmouth workshop did not live up to my expectations is that AI is harder
than we thought” (Muehlhauser 2016). Indeed.
Machine Translation (MT), the intelligence task that sparked so much initial excitement
about AI, was also the task that caused the government to pull back its funding when researchers
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failed to make more progress. The aforementioned English-to-Russian program worked by
crudely mapping words Russian to English words according to a bilingual dictionary and a set of
rules coded in one direction, meaning rules that could only translate from Russian to English and
not the other way around (Hutchins 1995 p. 2). At the time, researchers struggled to find a better
way to achieve more grammatically sensible translations. In 1966, a report was published by the
Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee (ALPAC), a group established by the U.S.
government at the request of the National Science Foundation. This report was effectively
devastating. “For years afterwards, an interest in MT was something to keep quiet about; it was
almost shameful. To this day, the 'failure' of MT is still repeated by many as an indisputable fact”
(Hutchins 2003).
Following the discovery of how difficult it truly is to define and simulate intelligence,
there was an era known today as the “AI Winter.” The U.S. government had abandoned the
pursuit of AI, and many researchers also felt that it was a lost cause. The length of this period is
debated by the computer science community. Some claim it was a ten-year period, while others
claim it lasted thirty years (Muehlhauser 2016). If the latter is true, the AI winter lasted roughly
from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s.
Importantly, the history of AI is also the history of our assumptions about intelligence.
The project of AI, as it was initially conceived, was the attempt to simulate human intelligence –
or rather, to simulate intelligence with the implicit assumption that intelligence is human. The
hope was that we could learn about ourselves by creating machines that could perform
intelligence tasks the way we do. But as computer scientists managed to create programs that
could play chess, translate languages, win Jeopardy, play Go… the solutions they found were far
from reflective of human intelligence. They constituted a series of sophisticated engineering
8
techniques. The AI Winter was a consequence of the assumption that the human mind is like a
symbol-processing machine, an approach now known as ‘Good Old Fashioned AI’ (GOFAI). It
turns out that the human brain does not solve problems in a serial fashion, it solves them quickly
by processing information in parallel. In light of this, computer scientists began working on
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP), the basic principle underlying the development of
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and later, deep learning algorithms. In cognitive science, the
shift from GOFAI to PDP is known as the shift from computationalism to connectionism.
Computationalism, or the computational theory of mind (CTM) works on the assumption
that the mind is a kind of computational system. Not a computer, a computational system. As
philosopher Ian Ravenscroft notes in his book about the philosophy of mind, “the existence of
computers does not establish that the mind is a computer; it only shows that computation is
physically possible” (Ravenscroft 88). Many proponents of computationalism compare the mind
to a Turing machine, a theoretical model of computation that follows a set of instructions to
manipulate symbols, step-by-step. Each operation results in a change in the ‘state’ of the
machine. The key aspect of this comparison is “Turing’s Thesis,” a claim that is commonly
misunderstood to mean that a Turing machine can compute anything that can be described as a
clear, valid set of instructions (Copeland 2017). What Turing really claimed was that Turing
machines can compute any problem from a class of problems solved by “effective methods”
(Copeland 2000). The details about effective methods are not entirely relevant here, but for
readers who are curious, effective methods meet the following conditions:
1) The method can be described as a finite set of instructions
2) The method will always produce the desired result in a finite number of steps
(given that the method is carried out without error)
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3) The method can be carried out by a human without assistance from a machine
(the human can, however, use pen and paper if they need to)
3) The problem requires no insight or ingenuity on the part of the human carrying it out
With these conditions, you can see how a misunderstanding could occur. Either way, the
comparison between the mind and Turing machines is not usually meant to be exact. Rather,
those who make the comparison mean to highlight the ability to manipulate symbols by
following an algorithm, a routine set of instructions for solving a problem. In response to this
thinking, a theory called connectionism arose. Proponents of connectionism take issue with the
idea that the mind solves problems by manipulating symbols in a step-by-step fashion. Instead,
they hold that the mind is like a network that has a myriad of simple units that process
information in parallel to solve problems. The connections between units in the network are
weighted, so that the paths between some units are taken much more than others.
Figure 1.1: An illustration of the difference between computationalism and connectionism.
Both models are highly simplified, but the juxtaposition of the two models should make clear
the contrast in the serial, step-by-step approach of the Turing Machine and the distributed,
parallel approach of the connectionist network.
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The critical thing to remember about the shift from computationalism to connectionism is
that, once computer scientists revised their understanding of intelligence, they were able to make
incredible progress in what they could achieve with their explorations of what constitutes
intelligence. An example I love to share is that of the massive improvements to Google Translate
that occurred in 2016 after the company replaced the previous model for their tool with a neural
network, called the Google Neural Machine Translation system (GNMT). Prior to the
introduction of the GNMT, Google’s translation tool implemented a translation scheme that
worked by mapping independent words and phrases to equivalent words and phrases in the target
language (Le and Schuster 2016).
Today, there are still technologists who are interested in modeling human intelligence
with computers, but much of the community involved in developing AI has shifted its
understanding of intelligence to a focus on a machine’s ability to perceive an environment and
change its goals in response. This is one reason why self-driving cars are an incredibly popular
project right now. The ability to safely navigate such a complicated environment as a road
captures many of the challenges that come with achieving intelligence as a kind of
responsiveness.
>> Goals of my Thesis
There is a clash of assumptions that is keeping machine ethics in limbo. My thesis aims to
highlight this tension by way of analyzing what is ostensibly a disagreement about agency. Once
I’ve laid bare what the disagreement is really about, there are two questions that need to be
addressed. The first is, what makes ethical decision-making distinct from other kinds of
decision-making? The second is, to what extent can machines engage with ethics and make
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ethical decisions? I will be answering these questions by proposing a method called
context-based modeling for machines, a framework that combines aspects of philosophy with
techniques already used in computer science. The primary goal of my thesis is to bridge the gap
in communication between the sciences and humanities by providing a framework that is rich
with opportunities for analysis and offers an actionable means for building ethical machines. I
would like for both philosophical and technical audiences to come away from my thesis with a
sense of direction. So with that, let’s begin by taking a look at the topic of agency.
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Chapter II: ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
A Disagreement about Agency
>> Hopes, Fears, and Assumptions
It is difficult to join the conversation about machine ethics without addressing the topic of
agency. The progress of AI research has generated a vast spectrum of ideas both for and against
the agency of machines, making agency one of the most widely discussed issues in machine
ethics. Concerns about the agency of other intelligent beings have long-preceded the existence of
computers, but computers have uniquely challenged our understanding of agency because they
show the potential to be more “intelligent” than we are, and yet they seem to lack so many of the
faculties necessary for traditional agency: intentionality, consciousness, free will, and so on.
There are scholars who prefer to move past the topic of agency, with some arguing that it
provides very little direction for designers and engineers. Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen argue
that the topic is only useful if it helps us to designate capacities needed for a machine’s
performance (Wallach and Allen, 58). In their view, whether or not a machine truly understands
what it is doing, or is conscious, or is acting freely is irrelevant if it makes no difference in the
machine’s behavior. There are other scholars who argue that the topic of agency is what makes
machine ethics a lost cause. Aimee van Wynsberghe and Scott Robbins take issue with the
language used by machine ethicists and argue that their use of the term ‘agency’ indicates a
possibly dangerous misunderstanding of what machines are capable of. They write, “One should
not refer to moral machines, artificial moral agents, or ethical agents if the goal is really to create
safe, reliable machines. Rather, they should be called what they are: safe robots” (Wynsberghe
and Robbins 732).
I will readily admit that I preferred to avoid the topic of agency for quite some time.
Asking engineers to program something like consciousness is probably overkill, I thought. I
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feared that disagreements about agency would derail the interdisciplinary collaboration that is so
crucial for the progress of machine ethics. But a closer look at the topic reveals that it has
generated a remarkable space for observing the hopes, fears, and assumptions scholars are
bringing into machine ethics as the field continues to emerge. In this chapter, I will present two
positions on machine agency – one in favor, one opposed. Then, I want to demonstrate how the
conflict between these positions raises problems that get at the scope of machine ethics itself. But
first, I will share a popular framework for measuring a machine’s agency that will help to
introduce the range of capacities machine ethicists examine in their work.
>> James H. Moor
One of the most widely cited works on machine agency is James H. Moor’s paper, “The
Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics,” published in 2006. The paper was one of
the first to address agency in terms of machine ethics. As such, Moor’s work helped to shape the
outlook of the field and he is considered one of the founding authors. He describes several kinds
of agency, each characterized by a different proximity to ethics. He effectively provides a scale
to measure the extent to which a machine can be (or is) an agent. This makes his framework
adaptable and thus more responsive to the wide variety of technologies. Before I describe the
opposing positions on machine agency, I would like to share Moor’s work because it helps to
introduce some of the language and themes that machine ethicists are working with.
According to Moor, computing technology is inseparable from ethics because it is, by its
nature, normative. He writes, “With technology, all of us – ethicists and engineers included – are
involved in evaluation processes requiring the selection and application of standards” (Moor 18).
For him, accounting for agency is important as computers “do jobs on our behalf” (Moor 18). At
the same time, their performance of these jobs has ethical import in many cases. He goes on to
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describe four kinds of agents. With each kind, I will be providing recent examples to show how
Moor’s framework has scaled over time.
Ethical-Impact Agents: This is the class of technologies which have some ethical (or
unethical) impact, either by design or by consequence of its use. YouTube, the largest video
sharing platform on the Internet (by far), uses deep-learning to recommend content to its users
and manage the monetization of videos hosted on the site. YouTube’s developers designed the
system to increase engagement with the site and protect themselves from legal trouble, but their
system has had countless impacts on both content creators and their viewers. There is a lot to be
said about the ecosystem created by the developer’s choices, but I’ll name one impact here. In
2019, a very dedicated YouTuber named Andrew Platt began creating a massive spreadsheet of
keywords deemed inappropriate for advertisers by YouTube’s algorithm. He created the
spreadsheet by posting hundreds of videos with different titles and checking whether or not the
video remained monetized. Through his work, he found that many words associated with the
LGBTQIA+ community were being systematically marked as inappropriate. Even videos with
the words ‘gay’ or ‘gender’ in their titles were being demonetized and hidden from
recommendations. A Washington Post article about the situation claimed that the site’s software
was “targeting” LGBTQIA+ creators, but this wording is probably not appropriate (Bensinger
and Albergotti). “Targeting” makes it seem as though someone or something is making the
choice, but it is more likely that the algorithm learned some negative association it shouldn’t
have. YouTube has never been very transparent about the way their algorithm works, so the
answer is unclear. Either way, their algorithm absolutely has ethical impacts by consequence of
its use.
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Implicit Ethical Agents: This is the class of technologies which include some measure for
the prevention of harm. The Apple Watch is a wearable technology equipped with an ECG.
Although, the watch does not just monitor the wearer’s heart rate – it issues an alert if it detects
an irregularity. There have been several people whose lives have been saved by this feature.
Explicit Ethical Agents: This is the class of technologies which are capable of ethical
decision-making. They possess some representation of ethics and operate on that knowledge
(Moor 20). More and more experimental work is being done in this area. A group of computer
scientists from the University of Liverpool created a system that verifies the decisions an
Unmanned Autonomous Vehicle (UAV) makes by testing them against ethical dilemmas (Dennis
et al.). Roboticist Ronald Arkin, a widely cited scholar in machine ethics due to his work on
robots and warfare, worked with colleagues Jaeuun Shim and Michael Pettinatti to make robots
that were augmented with an “Intervening Ethical Governor” (Nallur 2389). The system used
deontological ethics to constrain the behaviors of health-care robots.
Full Ethical Agents: This is the class of technologies that can make ethical judgements
and reasonably justify them. For now, this title is only held by humans. “It’s here that the debate
about machine ethics becomes most heated” (Moor 20).
Moor concludes his article by stressing the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration
for the advancement of machine ethics. Whether or not the development of full ethical agents is
possible is partly an empirical question and thus requires the participation of computer scientists.
But there is also the ever-present philosophical dimension of it all, as ethics remains a thorny and
controversial matter. “Not only do people disagree on the subject, but individuals can also have
conflicting ethical intuitions and beliefs,” Moor points out (Moor 21). And on that note, let’s take
a look at the disagreement this chapter is about.
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>> Luciano Floridi and Jeff Sanders
The first position in the disagreement on machine agency comes from an article titled,
“On the Morality of Artificial Agents,” written by Luciano Floridi and Jeff Sanders, two
computer science researchers from the University of Oxford. Their work is motivated by the
observation that machines have become a significant source of “im/moral” actions, yet our
understanding of agency remains unduly constrained by a focus on the human domain (Floridi
and Sanders 351). In their view, the concept of agency is essential as a means to analyze the new
problems raised by our technology, so its scope should be extended to include machines. But
there is still a considerable gap between the ethical capacities of us and our computers. For one
thing, we have yet to ascribe any moral patiency to a computer. How can we define agency in a
manner that respects this distinction? Floridi and Sanders believe the disagreement about agency
is due in part to the imprecision of the term. Unlike a mathematical function which may be
abstruse but ultimately definite after enough scrutiny, the term agency has not lent itself to a tight
set of necessary and sufficient conditions. The struggle to formally capture our every intuition
about agency is perhaps an indication that the term should have more than one definition – and at
least one of those definitions should include machines. Floridi and Sanders offer a way to
manage this by introducing what they call the “Method of Abstraction” (Floridi and Sanders
351).
The Method of Abstraction works by establishing a level of abstraction in order to
determine the object of one’s analysis. A level of abstraction (LoA) is like a scientific model, it
“consists of a collection of observables, each with a well-defined possible set of values or
outcomes” (Floridi and Sanders 354). And indeed, it would make sense to use abstraction as an
approach to machine ethics because the tool is one of the most vital for computer scientists and
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engineers. But the abstractions used by a programmer ultimately correspond to hardware.
Presumably, agency is not so tangible. So how could abstraction (the very opposite of
specification) help us to do away with the imprecision of the term?
Consider the definition of a tomato. To a botanist, it is a fruit. It develops from the flower
of a plant and it has seeds. Be that as it may, a chef is unlikely to put tomatoes in a fruit salad.
Implicitly, there is a difference in the levels of abstraction being used by the former and the latter.
According to Floridi and Sanders, “abstraction acts as a ‘hidden parameter’ behind exact
definitions” (Floridi and Sanders 352). Some LoAs are more common and more important to us
than others – which is why we usually take no issue with searching for tomatoes near the
vegetables in the grocery store, despite their phytological classification. However, “you say
to-may-to, I say to-mah-to” does not fly for the concept of agency. This would mean that agency
is a fuzzy, contested term because there is no dominant LoA associated with its application. Now
is as good a time as any to decide, then, what the LoAs for agency should be.
But first, I should address the looming presence of relativism that has ostensibly been
summoned by their position. Floridi and Sanders are not proposing we should be free to define
agency according to whatever suits our interests. (This would be an especially dangerous
perspective to have with regard to the agency of large corporations, for instance.) Recall that an
LoA is linked to a collection of observables. This makes LoAs “mutually comparable and
assessable” (Floridi and Sanders 355). The authors are trying to make way for pluralism, not
relativism. Both the botanical and culinary classifications of a tomato contain factors that can be
observed and agreed upon, such as the presence of seeds or a tomato’s acidic flavor profile.
With that out of the way, what should the LoA for agency be? At one LoA, an agent
could be anything that acts to produce some effect on the environment – but this is probably too
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high, too abstract an LoA for agency to be meaningful. Here, there is no difference between a
human being and an earthquake (Floridi and Sanders 357). So Floridi and Sanders propose that
one sense of agency should exist at an LoA below the threshold created by 1) interactivity, 2)
autonomy, and 3) adaptability, as defined below:
1) Interactivity: An agent and its environment (can) act upon each other.
2) Autonomy: The agent can act without response to being interacted with.
3) Adaptability: An agent can change its policy for acting.
The LoA for moral agency is established by adding another condition:  “An action is said
to be morally qualifiable if and only if it can cause moral good or evil. An agent is said to be a
moral agent if and only if it is capable of morally qualifiable action” (Floridi and Sanders 364).
But at this LoA, humans and machines remain indistinguishable – i.e., the authors have not yet
resolved the tension raised in the introduction. This is where a distinction between accountability
and responsibility becomes important. Like agency, the term responsibility is also bogged down
by a focus on the human domain. In this case, though, the focus is reasonable because
responsibility is more closely tied to psychological factors. And in fact, we can use this aspect of
the term to finally distinguish between human agents and nonhuman, machine agents.
According to Floridi and Sanders, those who equate accountability with responsibility
assume that “we should reduce all prescriptive discourse to responsibility analysis” (Floridi and
Sanders 368). They disagree with this assumption by citing the example of parents who practice
morality with their children without holding them responsible for making bad decisions.
Implicitly, the parents identify their children as sources of moral action. At the same time, they
accept that their children are not yet at an age when they can be subject to the process of moral
evaluation. Floridi and Sanders go on to state the following:
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“Trying to equate identification and evaluation is really just
another way of shifting the ethical analysis from considering x as
the moral agent/source of a first-order moral action y to
considering x as a possible moral patient of a second-order moral
action z, which is the moral evaluation of x as being morally
responsible for y. This is a typical Kantian move, but there is
clearly more to moral evaluation than just responsibility because x
is capable of moral action even if x cannot be (or is not yet) a
morally responsible agent” (Floridi and Sanders 368).
Therefore, a contrast can be made between humans and machines by specifying that humans are
morally responsible agents whereas machines are only morally accountable ones.
The account provided by Floridi and Sanders is helpful because it captures our intuitions
about our own agency while making room for the consideration of these new, more sophisticated
and impactful technologies. But there is something missing from their account. It glosses over
what makes ethics distinct. They use the phrase ‘morally qualifiable’ without explaining what
that means. We shall return to this issue in a later chapter. For now, let us move on to the second
position in the disagreement on machine agency.
>> Deborah Johnson
Deborah Johnson, one of the first scholars to publish a textbook about computer ethics,
offers another way to capture our intuitions about agency while making room for the
consideration of ethical issues raised by machines in her article, “Computer Systems: Moral
Entities but not Moral Agents.” But instead of expanding the definition of agency, Johnson
argues that machines belong to the category of moral entities, not moral agents. “Because of the
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efficacy of computers and computer systems, those who argue for the moral agency of computers
are quite right in drawing attention to the moral character of computer systems. However, they
seem to overstate the case in claiming that computer systems are moral agents,” she says
(Johnson 177). Whereas Floridi and Sanders find the human-centered parameters of agency
problematic, Johnson believes they are in place for good reason. Technology, she explains, is
human-centered too. “What computer systems are and what they do is intertwined with the social
practices and systems of meaning of human beings” (Johnson 168). That is, computer systems
are artifacts. They are made and used as a result of human social activity. Johnson worries that
by going so far as to claim that machines are agents, we will be separating them from this fact.
And crucial to Johnson’s view is the notion of intentionality. She wants to argue that machines do
not have intentions, they merely manifest the intentions of the people who developed the
machine and the people who end up using the machine. Thus, their categorization as moral
entities. When something goes wrong, Johnson wants the humans involved in the machine’s
design and deployment to be held responsible, not the machine itself. Her hope is that a focus on
human responsibility will push the tech community to anticipate the role of their work in
producing states of affairs (Johnson and Verdicchio 646).
Johnson begins her account by accepting contemporary action theory and using it as a
guide for sketching her definition of agency: internal states – desires, beliefs, and the like – result
in outward or embodied events with some effect on a recipient or patient. Humans, of course,
pass the test. She presumes that humans are free and that we can reason about and then choose
how we behave. Machines, however, fail to meet a significant condition. They lack intentionality.
When computers behave, they instead do so because of what Johnson calls a “triad of
intentionality” (Johnson 179). There is 1) the intentionality “put into” the computer system by
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the intentions of the system’s designer (Johnson 178). There is 2) the intentionality brought about
when a user provides input to the system. She says that computer users “use their intentionality
to activate the intentionality of the system” (Johnson 178). Lastly, there is 3) the latent
intentionality of the system itself. Not the computer, the computer system, which is the computer
paired with its meaning to us. The computer is “poised” to behave in a certain manner by virtue
of being an artifact, something wrapped up in human social activity (Johnson 179). But what
about complex, unpredictable systems with behaviors that appear to be far removed from the
intentions of the designer, like an AI created by a deep-learning algorithm? Johnson will
maintain that these systems are still just moral entities because the system’s designer facilitated
their actions and the system’s user initiated their actions. Without humans, the intentionality of a
computer system is inert.
Johnson clarifies the role of responsibility as it relates to her triadic definition of agency
in a more recent article titled, “AI, Agency and Responsibility: the VW Fraud Case and
Beyond.” In her view, an agent can only be responsible if it is intentional – although, the
connection between intentional action and responsibility is complex due to the many types of
intentions a human could have. And again, she maintains that unlike humans, machines are not
intentional and therefore cannot be held responsible for their actions. But in this article, she goes
further with her point by stating that “AI is computational, whereas intentions are not, that is, the
two are ontologically different” and “since [AI] consists of software running on hardware” there
is an “ontological chasm between computational artifacts and sentient beings (Johnson and
Verdicchio 645). Furthermore, there is little evidence to support the expectation that computers
will end up having intentions “like humans do” (Johnson and Verdicchio 645). Hm.
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On the one hand, I think Johnson’s emphasis on the human role in the design and
deployment of technology is valuable. It reminds me of an excellent point made by Marc
Canellas and Rachel Haga in a 2020 article featured in the proceedings of the Association for
Computing Machinery. Canellas is the current Chair of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) AI Policy Committee, and Haga is a data scientist. The pair argues that the
field of automation as it is understood by many is problematic because it neglects the human
involved in and affected by the task that is being automated. Engineers automate as much as
possible then shunt the rest to humans without any regard for the knowledge they might need to
figure out what happened or what comes next. Designing machines this way affects trust, and
more importantly, it has consequences for safety. This approach is simply unacceptable for
machine ethics. We must be mindful of what (or who) these machines are for, after all. And this
mindfulness needs to take place throughout the life cycle of any machine with the capacity to
cause ‘im/moral’ actions.
On the other hand, Johnson’s approach is riddled with assumptions that should not be
taken for granted when considering the radical novelty of machines. And herein lies the clash,
the disagreement that turns out to be more than one about agency.
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Chapter III: –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Machine Ethics in Limbo
>> Artificial Flavoring
Floridi, Sanders, and Johnson all seem to notice the same thing, namely the distinct
character of computers and what they are (and currently are not) capable of accomplishing in
comparison to humans. This is evident in that both of their positions make use of the word
artificial. What differs is the direction they take in trying to maintain this separation between
humans and machines. I want to use the disagreement between Floridi, Sanders, and Johnson to
shed light on a tension that is keeping machine ethics in limbo: the preservation of human
novelty versus the appreciation of machine novelty.
When it comes to what computers will be able to do in the future, I will admit that I am
an optimist. I do not want to be the person that takes a strong stance on what is or is not possible,
because the history of technology has shown those sorts of people to be wrong countless times. I
think about a famous article written by Vannevar Bush, an inventor and engineer who predicted
dozens of modern technologies in an article he published in 1945. He anticipated that “the
Encyclopoedia Britannica could be reduced to the volume of the matchbox” and the “author of
the future” would “cease writing by hand or typewriter and talk directly to the record” (Bush 5).
At the time, people thought his ideas were outlandish. Now, many of his ideas are captured by
the smartphone alone. I feel as though it is better to be optimistic about what is possible because
such an attitude will push us to try new things. These new things may not turn out the way we
expect – Bush, for example, thought that “dry” photography would prevail over digital
photography – yet, it is progress nonetheless (Bush 4). No matter the outcome, we will have
learned something, and that is never a waste of time.
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Still, I recognize there are limits to this thinking. Watching how the directors of Back to
the Future II imagined the year 2015 is amusing, to say the least. I wish they were right about
hoverboards. And as you may remember from my introduction, a handful of computer scientists
at Dartmouth College thought they could simulate human intelligence during one summer in the
1950s. They did not manage to achieve this. Frustrated with the unadulterated optimism he saw
in the computing community (specifically, the excitement surrounding the symbolic approach to
AI), philosopher Hubert Dreyfus is famously known for writing a book in the 1970s called, What
Computers Can’t Do. In the 1990s when the project of AI was regaining steam, he published a
second edition of the book called, What Computers Still Can’t Do. Was he correct? Yes and no.
He was right to criticize the ‘good old fashioned’ approach to AI (GOFAI) which was motivated
by the belief that the brain is like a machine that processes symbols and computers could
simulate human intelligence by simply doing the same. The AI Winter occurred partly because
much of the early optimism computer scientists had towards AI was thwarted by mistakes in
their philosophical assumptions about the nature of human intelligence. However, the critiques
Dreyfus made have less of a presence now that computer scientists have found new, unexpected
ways to make progress.
The disagreement between Floridi, Sanders, and Johnson appears to be another iteration
of what Massimo Negrotti calls “a true struggle between two cultures” (Negrotti 195). Negrotti is
a professor of the Methodology of Human Sciences and has had conversations with Dreyfus
about his views. He reflects on these conversations in his article, “Hubert Dreyfus, the Artificial
and the Perspective of a Doubled Philosophy.” Earlier, I pointed out a parallel between the work
of Floridi, Sanders, and Johnson. They all choose to use the word artificial, and Negrotti happens
to be another scholar who has an interest in this word. Well, it’s not just an interest. He has
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published several books on the subject. “[It] is exactly the concept of artificial that should be
deepened, because of its apparent power of setting up a sort of third reality which deserves a
careful understanding,” he notes in his article (Negrotti 198). Now, I don’t want to move too
deeply into Negrotti’s ideas because the “third reality” he mentions is used to describe his
concept of “naturoids,” which are machines that mimic natural processes and at the same time,
introduce new aspects to the process they imitate due to the difference in materials (Negrotti
195). It is a fascinating perspective, though, so here is a sample of his thoughts:
“[The] advancements of naturoids consist in generating a new
reality with own features crossing the natural and the technological
ones. A world that is not destined to growingly approximate the
nature, as the enthusiasts incline to think, nor to remain in a trivial
realm made of mere machines, as the opponents say and whose
general character and properties, and related socio-cultural effects,
will emerge progressively in the next decades. This will trigger a
sort of a new general evolutionary phase that in some measure is
already started. One more reason to support the idea that the
artificial should be studied in itself and in all the technological
species it consists of” (Negrotti 197).
I include Negrotti’s perspective because it helps to highlight the tension at hand. He takes
issue with philosophers who “[try] to match scientific knowledge with philosophical
conceptualizations and techniques, almost based on the views of past masters,” and so do I
(Negrotti 197). Johnson’s position is ostensibly one about agency, but her reasoning reveals itself
to be rooted in philosophical assumptions that are unhelpful to carry on with.
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She happily inherits a lot of assumptions from the Western philosophical tradition,
proceeding from the idea that humans are mostly rational and have a significant amount of
self-awareness and self-control. What makes us special is our ability to reason and then act on
reason. Sound familiar? In Greek philosophy, there is Plato’s notion of the rational soul and
Aristotle’s notion of rational animals. In his Discourse on Method, Descartes discusses human
rationality as well. And if it was not made clear by her position already, Deborah Johnson favors
Kantian ideals. “Perhaps the best known and most salient expression of this conception of moral
agency is provided by Kant,” she notes (Johnson 173).
The issue with these assumptions is that we know better by now. It turns out, most people
do not prioritize Reason alone when making decisions. Computer scientists realized this when
GOFAI failed to reproduce our intelligence. In psychology, the research done by Timothy Nisbett
and Richard Wilson challenges our confidence in our ability to introspect about the causes of our
behavior (Nisbett and Wilson 118). Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s groundbreaking
research about human decision-making shows that most of the time, Reason comes second to
heuristics.
Arguably, we are no longer the only things capable of reason. Arguably, computers are
now better at (formal) Reason than we are. But I’d rather not harp on this point, because what I
am really concerned about is Johnson’s insistence that in order to behave ethically, machines
have to be “like us” somehow (Johnson and Verdicchio 645). In order to make real progress in
machine ethics, I believe we have to move away from the tradition in several ways. First, we
must stop thinking that humans alone can be intelligent. Second, we must stop thinking that
things have to be like us to work – especially when there are still many unanswered questions
about what ‘us’ is ‘like,’ so to speak.
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I propose that these changes begin with embracing the title, machine ethics. In naming it
this, we have already identified machines as distinct and we have designated a focused space for
reckoning with their impacts. And within the context of Floridi and Sander’s position, this
specification helps us to establish our perspective. We’ve made the choice between botanist or
chef, so to speak. Now, I am not dismissing the value of learning by trying to create machines
that are human-like. I see that exercise as a separate goal. I do not believe it is necessary for
machines to possess all the capacities of a human for them to make ethical decisions. Thus, the
distinction between human ethics and machine ethics. But does this mean that machines cannot
really engage with ethics? What’s the point? Allow me to explain.
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Chapter IV: ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
What Makes Ethics Distinct?
>> Two Concerns
The disagreement between Floridi, Sanders, and Johnson turns out to be one with
implications that get at the very scope of machine ethics. This makes sense because machine
ethics is still an emerging field. Moreover, machine ethics is an interdisciplinary field, so
tensions were bound to arise as scholars with different backgrounds bring their knowledge to
bear on the matters at hand. I want to tighten up the definition of machine ethics by arguing that
the field should be just that: ethics for machines. But before I can really clarify what that means,
there are two concerns that must be addressed:
1. What makes ethical decision-making different from other kinds of decision-making?
2. To what extent can machines engage with ethics and make ethical decisions?
The first concern is one that was raised by Yale computer scientist Drew McDermott in his
article, “What Matters to a Machine?” He claims that accomplishing ethical decision-making
with machines would mean that we have solved many problems to do with reasoning in general –
so, ethics is an “AI-complete” problem (McDermott 93). The classification is a play on the
concept of “NP-complete” problems, or problems that are the most difficult for computers to
solve in any reasonable amount of time. As computer scientist David Eppstein puts it,
“NP-completeness is a form of bad news: evidence that many important problems can't be solved
quickly” (Eppstein 1996). No wonder McDermott concludes his article by declaring that
machine ethicists ought to “find a problem we can actually solve” (McDermott 112). Computer
scientists and engineers have made great strides in carrying out formal reasoning with machines,
but why is ethical decision-making so hard to figure out? Either there is something that sets
ethical decision-making apart from other kinds of reasoning and it needs to be clarified, or there
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is nothing special about ethical-decision making and machine ethics reveals itself to be based on
a false premise. Evidently, McDermott’s concern is a pressing one. And it should be clear why
the second concern threatens the scope of machine ethics as well. But even if there is no way for
a machine to ‘truly’ engage with ethics, there remains the issue of their significant impacts on us.
We need a way to mediate and analyze their actions.
I would like to address these concerns (especially the first concern) by taking an
approach that comes from semiotics, the study of meaning-making and communication through
signs. In his book, The Symbolic Species, neuroanthropologist Terrence Deacon offers a
framework that is based on a compelling synthesis of ideas from influential thinkers including
Charles Peirce, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell. His arguments work to acknowledge the
wide gap between animal and human communication without claiming that humans are uniquely
capable of meaning-making with language. We need to be clear on what ethics means to us
before we can instantiate ethical decision-making with machines, no? I believe semiotics, with
its focus on meaning-making, offers substantial tools for approaching a resolution to the
concerns raised above. In the following section, I will use Deacon’s framework to argue that
there is something distinct about ethical decision-making.
>> Deacon’s Hierarchy of Signs
Terrence Deacon’s work is prompted by a question about the apparent chasm between
animal and human communication. And yes, he argues, it is a chasm. Our lives are utterly
saturated with language, yet we grasp precious little about it. Scholars have tried to better
understand language by exploring it in terms of evolutionary continuity, but this way of thinking
only sharpens the blades of a longstanding Procrustean bias. Comparative studies of animals and
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humans tend to place language at the peak of communication so that every other form of
communication is “language minus something” (Deacon 53). It is not unreasonable to hold that
our language, like other features of our species, must have some ancestor common to other
creatures. Deacon notes that “extensive nonverbal communication is essential for providing the
scaffolding on which most day-to-day language communication is supported” (Deacon 53). For
instance, some animals gesture and so do we. However, we cannot deny the chasm that separates
us today. Some animals gesture – but scientists have yet to find another Earthly species that takes
time to contemplate the nature of the universe.
Deacon wants his readers to acknowledge how rare, how anomalous our way of
communicating is. He will argue that the chasm between animals and humans is really a
threshold we – with great effort – managed to cross at some point in our evolution. There are
several levels of representation and humanity managed to latch onto the highest one, the level of
the symbolic. And in doing so, our cognitive faculties were rearranged such that our brains are
now tremendously overbuilt for meaning-making. In more scientific terms, language is the
champion of disruptive selection, a type of evolution which selects for extreme versions of a
trait. Our capacity for finding and forging the symbolic has afforded us immeasurable benefits.
Yet it is all too easy for us to stir up a vortex of meaning that is hard to pull apart.
With this in mind, Deacon goes on to explain his approach to semiotics. It begins with a
reevaluation of the relationship between sense and reference. Scholars like Gottlob Frege and
Bertrand Russell thought of this relationship as a logical one shared between a sign and
something truly in the world. This perspective causes problems when you consider utterances
that are about something that does not exist. Where is the logic in that? Deacon takes this
relationship and turns it on its head with the help of concepts established by logician and
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philosopher Charles Peirce. He argues that the object of a reference is not bound by the contents
of the physical world, it is determined by interpretation. The nature of a reference is, in other
words, manifested by the cognitive response it elicits. He shifts the conversation about sense and
reference from what is being talked about to a focus on how we know what’s being talked about.
And as there are many ways to respond to something, there are many kinds of references. He
identifies three by using terms described by Peirce: icon, index, symbol.
An iconic representation is interpreted in a negative, im-mediate manner. Icons evoke
re-cognition in the most literal sense of the word. Interestingly, icons can “be a source of
discovery” by highlighting traits which might otherwise go unnoticed about the object being
represented – for instance, an uncanny caricature of a celebrity (Deacon 76). Icons can be said to
have “firstness,” they are understood as easily as apprehending the sight of someone you know
or hearing your own name. Again, they are understood im-mediately. An indexical representation
is propped up by a recurrent correlation in time and space between a sign and its object. You
interpret an index based on what is probable. Indices can be said to have “secondness,” the
object of the sign is once removed. “What makes one [thing] an index of another is the
interpretive process whereby one seems to ‘point to’ another” (Deacon 77). A symptom is an
example of an index, as there is no im-mediate relation between the smell of smoke and a fire.
The association is learned.
The level of the symbolic is where Deacon’s notion of a threshold enters the picture. This
is because the interpretation of the iconic and the indexical requires a competence for single
references, whereas the symbolic requires a competence for double-references. Symbolism
works by referring to both some thing or thought and other symbols. The realm of the symbolic
is characterized by a dynamic nexus of meaning that is created and maintained by us. But that is
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not to say that the meaning of a symbol is arbitrary. Deacon’s work builds on a foundation laid
by Charles Peirce. Importantly, Peirce’s ideas were always a work in progress. He adjusts his
terminology as he continues to develop his ideas, but he was never sure how to organize his
concepts. But throughout his work he is convinced that he is getting at something. In a letter to
American philosopher and psychologist William James, Peirce wrote, “Now it is easy to see that
my attempt to draw this three-way, ‘trivialis,’ distinction relates to a real and important
three-way distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of study before it is
rendered perfect” (Peirce 498). In the same letter, he tells James that he knows his work is far
from complete. “Others must carry the study further when I am gone, which will be, I fear, all
too soon for me to explain what work I have done,” he writes (Peirce 495). Deacon takes Peirce’s
something and organizes it by placing his concepts into a hierarchy. This means that your
understanding of something can be unfolded to reveal several parts that inform each other.
The hierarchy of signs is key to understanding Deacon’s account of the symbolic. “It
sounds pretty straightforward on the surface. But this simplicity is deceiving, because … it is one
kind of competence that grows out of and depends on a very different kind of competence” he
explains (Deacon 74). Our ability to gather meaning from an index is seeded and supported by
our ability to gather meaning from icons. The meaning of a symbol, then, is anchored in part by
firstness and secondness. But what puts a threshold between secondness and a symbol’s thirdness
is the unique competence required to gather meaning from symbols. Memorizing mere
correlations is not enough to engage with the symbolic – this is why there is a chasm between
our communication and that of animals. To understand the symbolic, one must participate in a
constant process of learning and unlearning. “Symbols don’t just represent things in the world,
they also represent each other,” Deacon says (Deacon 99). So, every time you encounter an
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instance of a particular symbol, you have to revise your understanding of its range in relation to
the object it is being applied to and its relationship to other symbols. Eventually, you shed the set
of whatever iconic and indexical relations supported your understanding as you grasp the
higher-order patterns that contribute to the nexus of meanings that surround a symbol. “The
process of discovering the new symbolic association is a restructuring event, in which the
previously learned associations are suddenly seen in a new light and must be reorganized with
respect to one another” (Deacon 93). You develop a sort of intuition about how to clue into the
meaning of a symbol when you come across it.
Figure 4.1: Deacon’s hierarchy. Dotted lines indicate a sign, while solid lines indicate an
object. Icons and indices are single-reference signs, but past the threshold are symbols, which
are double-reference signs. With this diagram, you can see how the hierarchy builds. Notice
the im-mediacy of icons and the way an indexical sign ‘points’ to its object. A symbol makes
reference to an object and to other symbols.
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>> Application to Ethics
Returning to the first of our two concerns, I want to argue that ethical decision-making is
distinct because it requires a competence for the symbolic. When we reason about ethics, we are
working from the top of Deacon’s hierarchy. He claims that insights about ethics “require some
of the most counter-intuitive shifts of perspective and recoding process of any symbolic activity”
(Deacon 432). This is in contrast to reasoning about something like biology, which comes from
the bottom of Deacon’s hierarchy. Imagine two undergraduate students, one is a philosophy
major and the other is a biology major. Now imagine these students have the opportunity to
speak with two other students studying the same subjects at a different school. It is likely that the
students studying biology will have no trouble understanding each other. One student could bring
up the lymph nodes and the other student would know what is being discussed. No matter what
textbooks were used, no matter who taught them about lymph nodes, both students can easily
talk about the same thing. The students studying philosophy however, might have very different
understandings of the same subject. The first student mentions authenticity and the second
student wonders whether the word is being used in Hegel’s sense, Heidegger’s sense, Taylor’s
sense, Sartre’s sense…? Or maybe they are using the word in a colloquial manner. Deacon’s
account of signs indicates that the two pairs of students are having different conversations
because the biology students are exchanging single-references while the philosophy students are
exchanging double-references. In other words, the first pair is discussing concepts closely
attached to the world while the second pair is discussing concepts primarily attached to other
concepts. Token-object relationships versus token-token relationships (Deacon 446).
That being said, I am not suggesting that ethics has no basis in the world. Here is another
way to think about the distinction. It could be argued that if we stopped valuing money, the
concept would lose its presence in the world. In other words, we do not have to use money.
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Bartering was a common way to settle debts before forms of fiat currency like paper money (or
more recently, cryptocurrencies) were established. Money is just one solution to the problem. But
what problem? At the bottom of it all, there is still the human propensity for exchange, a practice
that anthropologists call a “human universal” (Brown). Money could lose its presence but the
demand for exchange would remain. It is a behavior that is seen among all peoples known to
ethnography and history (Brown). And it is this fact that helps to support the presence of money
in the first place. It’s hierarchical, to use Deacon’s language.
So, could it also be argued that we do not have to use ethics? Well, there is a slight
incongruence of scope going on when you compare money to ethics. Money is one solution,
ethics is a class of solutions. It would be more appropriate to compare money to one theory,
arguing that we do not have to use, for instance, utilitarianism. Still, it is fair to wonder what
would happen if we stopped valuing ethics as a whole. Is there anything at the bottom of the
concept that sustains its presence? This is a difficult question, of course. But there is reason to
believe that there exists some part of the world that keeps ethics around. When a new domain of
human inquiry/activity becomes formalized, there is often a specialized branch of ethics that
develops along with it. Medical ethics, business ethics, legal ethics, computer ethics, sports
ethics, environmental ethics, cowboy ethics, the list goes on. It seems that ethics is anchored to
cooperation. Is that all? Humanity is a symbolic species, we seek meaning and we have feelings
about the things we do. Our cooperation means something to us. Therefore, ethics must also be
anchored to the valenced nature of our actions and interactions.
what it is + what it means = ethics
iconic/indexical symbolic
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If ethical decision-making requires a competence for such a distinct kind of reasoning,
can machines make decisions about ethics? There are already technologies that manipulate the
iconic and the indexical levels of Deacon’s hierarchy – but this is only one of the references
made by a symbol. The computational challenge is the learning and unlearning of world
knowledge associated with the second reference made by a symbol, the reference to other
symbols. Can machines have a competence for ‘what it is’ and ‘what it means?’ We can now
proceed to the second of the two concerns raised by the disagreement between Floridi, Sanders,
and Johnson. To what extent can a machine engage with ethics?
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Chapter V: ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
To What Extent Can Machines Make Ethical Decisions?
>> The Brains of Men and Machines
In Deacon’s view, machines cannot engage with ethics at all because they do not have the
capacity to be a participant – that is to say, a subject – in the process of interpreting symbolic
references. He sets up his point by discussing Searle’s Chinese Room, but not in the way you
might expect. Philosopher John Searle introduced what is now a well-known thought experiment
in which there is a man using a book of rules to translate Chinese from inside of a closed room.
The man has no idea what any of the characters mean, he is simply following the rules in the
book, which are written in English. But from outside of the room, the responses he gives are
indistinguishable from that of a native Chinese speaker. Searle uses the experiment to argue that
the man in the room is like a computer executing a program. Neither the man nor a computer can
understand the content of what is being manipulated, even if they give the appearance that they
do.
Deacon takes issue with Searle’s approach, arguing that it helps to challenge our
intuitions but the design of the thought experiment fails to really capture the difference between
mind and mechanism (Deacon 445). So Deacon reframes the thought experiment in terms of his
semiotic hierarchy and asserts that the questions raised by the room do not correspond to
consciousness as a whole, instead they get at those parts of human consciousness that have to do
with the level of the symbolic. Searle’s thought experiment “emphatically begs the question:
What’s wrong with the picture?” (Deacon 445). What’s wrong, Deacon says, is the walls. The
symbolic can never be a part of the room because the room is closed off from the world – you
can only reach the indexical, which is exactly what the man is working with when he follows the
rules in his book. The man in the room can respect the associations between Chinese characters
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but he has no knowledge about the objects of those characters (the lower level reference) or how
those objects/events relate to each other (the reference to other symbols).
Some might respond to Deacon’s criticisms by claiming that the mind “is like the sort of
‘computation’ that takes place in electronic computers” (Deacon 442). It’s all just software
running on hardware. And if we can comprehend the symbolic, why can’t a sufficiently
sophisticated computer do the same? Deacon suspects that the comparisons made between
computers and the brain are due in part to the language we’ve adopted to describe the way
computers function. Here, I am reminded of an argument made by Edsger Dijkstra, a pioneer in
the field of computer science. Dijkstra held very strong opinions about the goals of computer
science and how the discipline ought to be understood by those who study it. In a presentation
titled, “On the Cruelty of Really Teaching Computer Science,” Dijkstra argues that computers
are a “radically novel” invention and we should think of them as such. Therefore, it is wrong for
us to “reason by analogy” and speak about computers in anthropomorphic terms (Dijkstra 1988).
In an oral history, Dijkstra commented on his time in America by saying he was “shocked by the
clumsy, immature way in which they talked about computing. There was a very heavy use of
anthropomorphic terminology, the electronic brains or machines that think” (Dijkstra 2001). Yes,
computers can ‘compute’ the answer to a mathematical problem but the way they do so is
nothing like the way humans would ‘compute’ their answer to the same problem. Just as the way
a computer plays chess tells us little to nothing about how chess Grandmaster Garry Kasparov
plays the game.
The reality is that the current architecture of most computers is far from being similar to
the structure of the brain. Computers present “a sharp discontinuity” for which “our past
experience is no longer relevant,” Dijkstra says (Dijkstra 1988). An interesting and somewhat
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unusual way to think about this difference is described by neuroscientist Ernest W. Kent in his
book, The Brains of Men and Machines. We have not been able to create a brain-like computer
because “the brain and the computer have developed in an evolutionary manner” towards very
different ends, he says (Kent 5). Human beings are adaptable, general intelligences with multiple
means for perceiving their environments whereas computers are hugely context-based tools made
to solve specific problems. Furthermore, there is a substantial difference in the “hardware”
available to nature versus engineers (Kent 5). Any similarities shared by a logic gate and a
neuron are far outweighed by discrepancies in speed and quantity, among other things.
It should be noted, however, that computers have changed a great deal since the 1980s,
when Kent published his book. In fact, scientists from Zhejiang University recently created what
is currently the world’s largest neuromorphic computer. Its name? Darwin Mouse. And the
computer’s operating system is called “DarwinOS” (Borak 2020). A neuromorphic computer is
one that is designed to be brainlike. Quite a remarkable development, given Kent’s perspective
just forty years ago. But the computer only has as many neurons as the brain of a mouse, hence
its name. The hope is that the scientists will be able to “continue developing the Darwin series of
brain-like computers in the direction of human intelligence, just like biological evolution,” one
scientist said (Borak 2020).
While Deacon doesn’t believe machines can engage with ethics now, he is not opposed to
the thought that they could in the future. He claims that the current architecture of computers
cannot develop the competence for the symbolic, but he is open to the possibility of a completely
different architecture that could support sentience and thus a competence for the symbolic.
Perhaps Darwin Mouse is a step in this direction. But in the meantime, Deacon’s perspective –
which was helpful for demonstrating what makes ethical decision-making distinct – presents an
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significant obstacle for addressing our second concern, the extent to which a machine can engage
with ethics. So, it is finally time for me to make clear what I mean when I say we ought to
embrace “machine ethics” as such.
>> Machine Ethics, Ethics for Machines
Evidently, ethics as we have understood it for so long is a very human thing. It is deeply
informed by our capacities as humans. It would be absurd for someone to declare that
omniscience is a requisite for ethics, because that would mean that no human could ever come
close to being Good. I want to argue that it is similarly absurd to insist that something like
consciousness is required for machines to engage with ethics. Computers are radically novel.
Therefore, machine ethics should be seen as an opportunity to rethink ethics as something
machines can engage with qua machines. There should be a difference between a Good human
and a Good machine because they are good at different things. Now, I am not advocating for
some hard division between human ethics and machine ethics. Rather, I picture machine ethics as
being part of human ethics because machines are, for the most part, built by us for us.
Deborah Johnson was right to worry about removing designers and engineers from the
conversation about what went wrong when a machine causes harm. It is our values and our
choices that determine whether or not a machine gets built and deployed to begin with. But we
have reached a point where the most high-impact machines (in both the software and hardware
sense) are intricate and are developed over time by large teams of people, all with different
concentrations. The project managers are interested in making sure the machine meets the needs
of its stakeholders. The programmers are interested in making sure the software’s logic is sound.
The engineers are interested in making sure the hardware supports the functioning of the
41
machine’s software. And so on. Intentions are difficult to maintain throughout the development
process of a project so large, so complex – even when everyone involved tries their best to do so.
Figure 5.1: I am not advocating for a separation of machine ethics from human ethics (left).
Instead, I am arguing that machine ethics is a part of human ethics (right).
In The Alignment Problem, writer and computer scientist Brian Christian shares the story
of some programmers who were trying to get a small boat to win a race on its own. They placed
markers along a course and each marker was worth points. They figured that if they programmed
the boat to ‘get the most points’ it would advance along the course to pass the markers and
eventually finish the race. Their intention was for the boat to finish the race, with ‘get the most
points’ being a proxy for that goal. But what happened was the boat went in circles around one
of the markers scoring endless points without making it any further to the finish line. A more
serious example Christian shares is a situation where several researchers competed with each
other to see who could develop the best model for predicting the risk of death from pneumonia.
A pretty noble intention, it is a tool that could help a lot of people. The researcher who developed
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a neural network won the competition by a wide margin, but upon further inspection, the team
realized that the model had determined that patients with asthma are at low risk for death from
pneumonia. This is obviously not good and very wrong. In the data used to train the network,
patients with asthma were more frequently hospitalized for pneumonia, so the model interpreted
them as being low risk because patients who are hospitalized are less likely to die. Good
intentions, bad outcome.
As I mentioned in the previous section, machines are best developed within a
well-defined context. Problem solving in computer science involves taking the time to
understand the problem space for what it is, then finding a solution for that problem. Machine
ethics should begin with this in mind. I would like to put forward an approach called
context-based modeling, which comes from some of the ideas laid out by Floridi and Sanders.
Their Method of Abstraction highlights the notion that experts in different disciplines can engage
with the same subject in distinct yet comparably rigorous ways. Consider the difference between
fairness in business and fairness in medicine. For each field, the principle has a nuanced body of
meaning about it that helps to guide the field’s practices. Any attempt to generalize how fairness
is carried out in both business and medicine would dilute the potency of what the principle
implies for professionals working in either field. Context-based modeling works by defining the
model of a Good machine according to the goals of that field. In contrast to humans, we know
what the telos of a machine is because we choose it. We ought to use this fact to our advantage
and allow it to inform the policies for the machine’s decision-making.
>> Machines doing Good Work
I propose that experts who are deeply familiar with the problem space of their discipline
should define the model of a Good machine. Here, I need to make a comment about the role of
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experts before I continue with my explanation of context-based modeling. Expert consensus is a
somewhat common suggestion for how to approach machine ethics. Susan and Michael
Anderson, two of the scholars who helped to establish the field, include ethicists as a key part of
their methodology. Initially, leaning on expert consensus seemed like a cop-out to me. A way to
patch a hole in an otherwise complete argument. But with regard to the importance of context,
experts are incredibly valuable. Anyone who spends years immersed in a particular discipline is
bound to have keen insights about what makes the discipline tick and what gets in its way.
American psychologist Richard Dawes was intrigued by research which showed that
statistical models, sometimes very simple ones, consistently outperform expert human
decision-makers in countless domains. He conducted his own research on the matter and found
the same thing. He was stunned. “Given the complexity of the world, why on earth should such
dead-simple models – a simple tally of equally weighted attributes – not only work but work
better than both human experts and optimal regressions alike?” he wondered (Christian 96).
Upon further thought, Dawes concluded that linear models “cannot replace the expert in deciding
such things as ‘what to look for,’ but it is precisely this knowledge of what to look for in
reaching the decision that is the special expertise that people have” (Christian 97). The linear
models work so well because there were years of work done by experts to designate what their
variables should be to begin with. So that is why experts are a part of my position.
Now, what is a model of a Good machine? And what makes it ethical? A model of a
Good machine is one that contains a set of virtues that are important to the context the machine is
being deployed in. The process of defining this model differs from simply defining performance
requirements because it accounts for the impact of the machine on the humans involved in its
use. This is what makes it ethical. As Susan and Michael Anderson put it, “Correct ethical
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behavior does not only involve not doing certain things, but also attempting to bring about ideal
states of affairs” (Anderson and Anderson 330). But how is this worth a distinction between
human ethics and machine ethics? It seems as though I’ve assigned much of the work to the
humans – what is the machine’s role in all of this? Where in the process is the machine involved
in making ethical decisions?
I realize that I’ve yet to share my own view on machine agency. Now would be a good
time to share it, as I think it will help to answer the questions raised above. I agree with the
foundation laid out by Floridi and Sanders; I think machines can be agents at a particular Level
of Abstraction. But instead of using the term ‘artificial agents’ – which, as I’ve explained, is
somewhat loaded already – I’d like to use the term virtual agents. Consider the difference
between the phrases ‘artificial reality’ and ‘virtual reality.’ The latter has more meaningful
connotations. Artificial suggests an imitation, something lacking the potency of the original.
Virtual better captures the (unique) force of the new thing. And that’s just it: there are machines
that can cause just as much good or harm as some people can. There are machines that are
forceful and can have impacts that are substantial. Additionally, the term virtual already has a
powerful meaning in computer science – virtual reality being one example. The Association for
Computing Machinery hosts the International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents.
Recently, a lot of work has been done to develop virtual negotiators, virtual job recruiters, virtual
educators, et cetera. I should note, however, that many of these virtual agents are meant to be
human-like so it feels more natural to interact with them. This is not necessary for my definition
of virtual agents. But making the connection to language already used in computer science helps
to improve the interdisciplinary communication necessary for machine ethics to work.
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Now, a machine’s potential to cause good or harm is not enough to establish its status as a
virtual agent. GPT-3 is a sophisticated natural-language AI that can do such things as generate
tweets, translate between languages, and even write programs. In 2020, a college student named
Liam Porr generated entire blog posts with the tool, one of which became the top trending post
on Hacker News the day it was published. He later confessed to the true nature of his posts and
reflected on his experiment in an article he wrote himself titled, “What I Would Do with GPT-3 if
I had no Ethics.” Porr’s experiment was ultimately harmless, but it raised many concerns about
what could happen if the tool became widely accessible. “As soon as this thing enters the public I
think it’s going to usher in a new era of internet chaos,” he said (Porr). The potential for GPT-3
to cause good or harm is clear – however, it has no means for perceiving, let alone evaluating, its
impacts on the world. There is no measure in place that would stop someone from trying to
generate and spread thousands of tweets containing misinformation, for example.
In order for a machine to be a virtual agent, it must have an interface: a virtualized
representation of its environment and a means to register 1) its actions and 2) the effect of its
actions, or rather, the state of its environment after it makes a decision. This information is
indispensable for any machine that is supposed to make ethical decisions. Notably, though, the
representation of the machine’s environment does not have to be exhaustive. It’s all about
context, the machine needs access to the salient features of the problem space it is meant to
address. Think of it this way. When a doctor is treating a disease, she may not always have a
fulsome view of the disease itself. Instead, she works with a representation of the disease built by
indicators of the patient’s state. She monitors the state of the disease by monitoring these
indicators. And such a representation is often enough for her to do her job, and do it well.
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>> Ethical Decision-Making versus Ethical Reasoning
One more thing needs to be made clear with regard to my view on machine agency. You
might have noticed that I have been intentional about using the phrase, ‘ethical
decision-making.’ In my view, there is a difference between ethical decision-making and ethical
reasoning insofar as these concepts relate to machine ethics. They require different skills. And
this difference is one of the things that characterizes the distinction between human ethics and
machine ethics. Ethical reasoning is the process of developing theories and defining ethical
principles. This type of thinking requires a sophisticated ability to engage with the symbolic,
connect ideas, and reason about the parameters of ethics itself. Ethical decision-making involves
applying or instantiating established principles. Constructing the calculus versus performing the
calculus, if you will. Humans can do both, while machines should be able to perform ethical
decision-making given a sufficient interface for doing so.
I must emphasize the role of the environment in all of this, as that is what makes ethical
decision-making a skill. In her article, Deborah Johnson uses the example of a search engine to
point out the intentionality of the designer and the user in its functioning. “What artifacts do is
receive input and transform the input into output,” and “the output [of the search engine] is a
function of how the system has been designed and the input I gave it,” she explains (Johnson
178). Her example fails to acknowledge the role of the environment, in this case the dynamic
ecosystem of web pages and how they are linked to each other. Heavy-duty search engines do
not simply receive a query and return a list of webpages, there is a complex algorithm that works
in response to the ever-changing makeup of the Internet.
So, a machine has an active role in making ethical decisions and is therefore a virtual
agent because of its response to its environment. When asked about what intelligence is, John
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McCarthy – the computer scientist who coined the term ‘Artificial Intelligence’ and who
endeavored to accomplish such a project during that summer at Dartmouth – says it is “the
computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world” (McCarthy). A team of
developers can do their best to facilitate the algorithms for a machine to make its decisions, but
the machine has a role in responding to novel situations and making decisions about them. They
are virtual agents because they work from a context-based representation of their environment
and yet their decisions have great efficacy.
>> The Importance of Machine Agency
Classing certain machines as virtual agents is valuable for achieving a greater depth of
analysis when something goes wrong. A study conducted in 2020 by Human-Machine
Communication (HMC) researcher Andrea Guzman sought to identify the key factors that make
up the apparent ontological divide between humans and computers. She found that people often
cite emotions and certain attributes of intelligence, but “for most people, there is no singular
ontological boundary; there are multiple divides, some of which serve as the foundation for
others.” At the same time, new technologies challenge these boundaries, especially that of
emotion (Guzman 50, 51). It stands to reason that the rapid improvement of our technology will
only continue to challenge all of these ontological boundaries. Working with the language of
virtual agents allows us to better adapt to the actions and effects of new technologies as they
come along.
I appreciate Deborah Johnson’s emphasis on the human’s role in the design and
deployment of a machine, but her emphasis on human intentionality makes for a messy analysis
of a machine’s performance. Even before things go wrong, classing certain machines as virtual
agents is valuable as a means to structure the way powerful machines get designed in the first
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place. Requiring experts and engineers to deeply consider a machine’s purpose and the context of
its use will press them to better anticipate what sort of impacts are permissible and which
impacts go against the virtues of the discipline. Instead of focusing only on the intentions of the
designers and the users of the machine – which can get lost through the complexity of both the
sheer amount of people who interact with the machine and the complexity of the machine itself –
the evaluators of a machine’s performance can look to the model of what Good performance






The account I have provided seeks to offer a robust framework for how philosophers,
computer scientists, and other experts can work with each other to create machines that do a
Good job. I began by discussing the most prevalent and pressing topic in machine ethics, the
topic of agency. As researchers from diverse disciplines contribute to the growing conversation
about the status of machines, they bring with them their hopes, fears, and assumptions. Agency
gets at some of the most fundamental aspects of ethics, so it makes sense that a disagreement
about agency could reveal itself to have consequences for the parameters of ethics itself. Once I
brought forward the greater implications of what was ostensibly a disagreement about agency, I
addressed two questions:
1. What makes ethical decision-making different from other kinds of decision-making?
2. To what extent can machines engage with ethics and make ethical decisions?
Theoretical schemes from semiotics helped to illustrate the way ethics is entwined in
human meaning-making. Terrence Deacon’s hierarchy of signs showed that ethical
decision-making is distinct from other kinds of decision-making because it involves the ability to
recognize what a situation is as well as what it means. Although Deacon is skeptical of the notion
that machines could engage with ethics, he is open to machines with entirely different
architectures that could participate in the learning and unlearning required to interpret signs at
the level of the symbolic. However, my proposal for context-based modeling is an attempt to
reconstruct ethics as something that the machines we have now can engage with. Machine ethics,
ethics for machines. Once the community involved in creating AI shifted their understanding of
intelligence to make room for alternatives to our way of doing things, they made exponential
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leaps in what they were able to achieve. Anthropomorphism often gets a bad rap, especially
amongst the sciences. Drew McDermott calls it “the Original Sin of AI,” which is “harder for
[him] to condone than to eat a bug” (McDermott 100). Still, I think there is some value in the
practice of using machines to learn more about ourselves. Sinful or not, the project of developing
AI has led to increased collaboration between multiple disciplines. In Matter and Consciousness,
philosopher Paul Churchland describes how the development of artificial neural networks
prompted researchers to ask novel questions about the human brain. And in general, the
challenge of defining intelligence has pushed us to more deeply reflect on what makes us
intelligent.
But the human way is not the only way. The simulation of human biological processes is
not necessary for the humbler goal of making better, more trustworthy and dependable machines.
My hope is that, in embracing the radical novelty of machines as virtual agents – agents who
may lack whatever ‘mysterious’ features of humanity are necessary for traditional agency yet
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